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Are There Really “Plenty of Shapiros Out There”? 
A Comment on the Courage of Norma L. Shapiro  
By Reid Kress Weisbord1 and David Hoffman2 
Edited Volume of Essays on Notable American Judges 
(Kevin Peppers, ed., University of Virginia Press, forthcoming 2018) 
 
Abstract 
Norma Levy Shapiro, a trailblazing United States District Court Judge whose 
tenure on the Philadelphia federal bench spanned nearly 40 years, died July 22, 
2016. This memoriam, written by two former law clerks, reflects fondly on 
Judge Shapiro’s judicial courage to follow her conscience even when doing so 
required making deeply unpopular decisions. To illustrate, this memoriam 
examines three of Judge Shapiro’s most memorable cases from her notable 
prisoner litigation docket.  
First, in Harris v. Pernsley, Judge Shapiro’s principled but polarizing decisions 
in the Philadelphia prison overcrowding litigation elicited a now-familiar 
brand of snark from one (tremendous! but imperfectly informed) 
commentator, who warned readers: “Unfortunately, there are plenty of 
Shapiros out there, which is one major reason why our streets are full of 
dangerous convicts.” Despite frequent and equally hostile commentary from 
the Philadelphia press, Judge Shapiro’s handling of the case brought about the 
closure of a notoriously derelict prison and the construction of new criminal 
justice facilities in Philadelphia. Second, in Chadwick v. Janecka, Judge Shapiro 
ruled unconstitutional the indefinite detention of a petitioner who refused to 
repatriate hidden offshore assets in a divorce proceeding. After reversal on 
appeal in an opinion written by then-Judge (now Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Alito), the petitioner went on to serve a record-breaking term of 
incarceration for civil contempt (14 years). Third, in Evans v. Beard, Judge 
Shapiro held that principles of finality prevailed over the state’s interest in the 
                                                             
1 Vice Dean, Professor of Law, and Judge Norma L. Shapiro Scholar, Rutgers Law 
School 
2 Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
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belated correction of an erroneously lenient sentence 11 years after it had 
been imposed. 
Judge Shapiro always followed her conscience along the difficult path to justice 
and exhibited rare courage to do what was right. If there are, indeed, “plenty of 
Shapiros out there,” the world would be more just. But alas, there aren’t, and 
there never were. 
* * * 
We former law clerks submit this tribute in memory of the late 
United States District Court Judge Norma Levy Shapiro, a judicial luminary of 
nearly forty years on Philadelphia’s storied federal bench.  We take joy in 
knowing that much was written in praise of Judge Shapiro during her life 
and we incorporate by reference the extensive record of her countless 
accomplishments and trailblazing firsts.3  But we begin not with praise, but 
with the words of one (tremendous!) observer—writing in 2000—on how 
the Judge handled her most famous case: Harris v. Pernsley.4 
Criminals are often returned to society because of forgiving 
judges. This has to stop. A judge who decides unilaterally to 
reduce sentences can cause immediate damage to a 
community if he or she releases dangerous criminals from 
jail. That’s why we need to hold judges more accountable, 
and the best way to make that happen is to elect them. When 
they hurt us, we need to make sure we can vote them out of 
the job. 
Think what wonders a public vote would work on the career 
of Norma Shapiro, a district court judge in Pennsylvania who 
was appointed by President Jimmy Carter. I think Carter has 
                                                             
3 See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Lending Light to Countless Lamps: A Tribute to 
Judge Norma Levy Shapiro, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Edward R. Becker, Tribute to 
Judge Norma Levy Shapiro, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 5 (2003); Louis H. Pollak, Norma Levy 
Shapiro, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 9 (2003); Anita B. Brody, Norma Levy Shapiro, 152 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 15 (2003); Jerome J. Shestack, Tribute to Judge Norma L. Shapiro, 152 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 21 (2003); Ellen P. Goodman, Tender Justice: Judge Norma Levy Shapiro’s 
Hard-Headed Humanity, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 25 (2003). 
4 Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
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done a lot for the world, but Judge Norma Shapiro was not 
his most brilliant appointment. 
Shapiro once ordered the release of six hundred prisoners, 
apparently because she thought prisons were getting too 
crowded. I should add that she ordered the release of six 
hundred prisoners per week. Guess what happened next. 
As reported in Crime: Turning the Tide in America, the U.S. 
Senate brought in witnesses in June 1997 to find out the 
extent of the disaster Judge Shapiro had created. They 
described a nightmare. One witness told the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that during one eighteen-month period after 
Shapiro’s jailbreak, the released convicts committed nearly 
ten thousand crimes, including seventy-nine murders, ninety 
rapes, and hundreds of other violent crimes. One victim, 
Daniel Boyle, was a twenty-one-year-old Philadelphia police 
officer. From 1988 to 1992, 20 percent of thugs arrested for 
killing cops were out of probation or parole. In my opinion, 
Judge Shapiro was a willing accessory to all those crimes. 
Unfortunately, there are plenty of Shapiros out there, which 
is one major reason why our streets are full of dangerous 
convicts.5 
Who “wrote” this passage? 
Donald J. Trump.   
This account of Judge Shapiro’s conduct during Harris contains 
several “alternative facts.” 6  But we use it to frame this memoriam because it 
                                                             
5 Donald Trump, The America We Deserve [Kindle Loc. 1184-85] (Renaissance Book 
2000). 
6 Among them (and excluding the case’s origin and history, which we will discuss in 
the text): the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing was held in June 1998, not 1997; 
the “witness” testimony before the Judiciary Committee appears to refer to remarks 
made by Senator Orin Hatch during a debate about the Judicial Improvement Act of 
1998; and, in Hatch’s account, the number of inmates released was 500, not 600, per 
week. 144 Cong. Rec. S6181-04, 144 Cong. Rec. S6181-04, S6188, 1998 WL 306901. 
Fifteen years after publication of President Trump’s comments, the death sentence 
of the defendant convicted in the murder of Police Officer Daniel Boyle was 
commuted based on evidence of the defendant’s severe intellectual disability. 
Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270 (Pa. 2015). To be fair to President Trump, 
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sheds light on a crucial aspect of her judicial personality and approach to 
judging. Consider, for a moment, the oddity that a district judge had such a 
profound, and controversial, impact on the public debate that Donald 
Trump, of all people, attacked her years before he was a national political 
figure. For literally decades, Norma Shapiro was among the most 
controversial and polarizing federal trial judges in the nation, and for almost 
all that time, she was on the receiving end of attacks like Trump’s—some 
couched more formally, others more obscenely.  She rarely, if ever, 
responded to such criticisms in public, though they wounded her.  Rather, 
she stood her ground, and persevered.  
 It takes rare guts to stick to your principles given such headwinds.  
We organize our comments around those guts—to provide particular 
examples of Judge Shapiro’s courage in action. 
Of the thousands of matters before her court, this narrative selects 
three memorable cases that we believe exemplify Judge Shapiro’s ability and 
willingness to accept public criticism when she believed justice required an 
unpopular decision.  Judge Shapiro never viewed herself as a reformer of the 
criminal justice system. Indeed, she was known to heap scorn on those that 
expected her to articulate a judicial philosophy.  “My job is to resolve cases!” 
she’d exclaim.  And yet, many of her most notable decisions had a 
profoundly positive effect on criminal adjudication and corrections law.  So 
our focus is on her prisoner litigation docket, though she was equally if not 
more interested in civil law. 
In each of the following three cases, Judge Shapiro found the state 
had violated the Constitution and she ordered some or all of parties released 
from prison.  In each case, Judge Shapiro assumed the risk of reversal and 
the boomerang of public criticism for making a unpopular decision 
necessary to prevent other branches of government from abusing power.  
We hope this narrative will outline a rough sketch of Judge Shapiro’s 
constitutional philosophy, capture the essence of her compassionate and 
courageous approach to criminal justice, and impart her belief in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
we’re quite sure he probably didn’t read, and certainly didn’t write, the passage, at 
least not unilaterally. 
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importance of judicial independence as safe harbor for courts to operate free 
from external interference. 
I. Harris v. Pernsley: The Philadelphia Prison 
Overcrowding Litigation  
We begin with Harris, the controversial case for which Judge Shapiro 
reluctantly attracted perhaps the most national attention. We refer to Harris 
as shorthand for decades of litigation before Judge Shapiro in which inmates 
challenged the problem of endemic overcrowding in the Philadelphia prison 
system.   
Harris found its origins in Pennsylvania’s state courts.  In 1971, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the condition of Philadelphia’s 
prisons as dangerous if not uninhabitable: 
“[T]he living conditions at Holmesburg [Prison, in particular, 
were] disgusting and degrading. The cells, originally built 
(between 1896 and 1920) to house one man, were seriously 
overcrowded. The physical condition of the cells is most 
unwholesome. Rainwater leaks into the cells through the 
skylights when it rains, soaking the bed coverings. The cells 
are infested with cockroaches and sometimes rats. Blankets, 
kept for six months at a time, become filthy. Prisoners 
charged with serious crimes may and frequently are confined 
with prisoners charged with much lesser offenses.”7 
For years, inmates had claimed such conditions violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.8  In the 1970s, 
the state courts repeatedly ordered the City to correct the problem to no 
avail.9  State courts approved a series of consent decrees mandating reform, 
and, without success, appointed a special master to supervise the 
implementation of injunctive relief.10  The City, citing lack of resources and 
                                                             
7 Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 1971) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Jackson v. Hendrick, 321 A.2d 603, 604 (Pa. 1974). 
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the enormous cost of reform, refused to act so the problem continued 
unabated.  
In 1982, Judge Shapiro was randomly assigned a class action filed by 
inmates housed at the notorious Holmesberg Prison.11  Philadelphia and the 
Commonwealth, jointly moving to dismiss, relied on doctrines of res 
judicata, the 11th amendment, and federalist deference to pending state 
court proceedings. Judge Shapiro agreed and dismissed the case on those 
grounds. The Third Circuit reversed, over a dissent by Judge Garth.12  The 
defendants petitioned for rehearing en banc.  Five of eleven judges voted to 
rehear the case, which was one short of the majority required.13 The 
Supreme Court denied  a petition for certiorari over the votes of three 
Justices, Berger, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, who would have granted it. Chief 
Justice Burger, in a rare written dissent on certiorari, stated that he would 
reverse the Third Circuit, which had, in turn, reversed Judge Shapiro.14 
 We dilate on this procedure only to show how reluctant Judge 
Shapiro was to take on Harris. When it was forced back on her docket, she 
tried to settle the dispute.  In 1986, following a series of hard fought 
negotiations, and over the District Attorney’s staunch objection, the City 
settled the matter by consent decree.15  The court-approved settlement 
agreement imposed flexible caps on the City’s maximum inmate capacity and 
required the construction of new detention facilities over a multi-year 
period.  To ensure compliance, the consent decree included an inmate 
release provision that soon became the most controversial aspect of the 
proceeding: 
“If the population of any facility still exceeds its maximum 
allowable population twenty-one (21) days from the date on 
which the maximum allowable population has been exceeded 
for more than seven (7) consecutive days or for more than 
                                                             
11 Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985). 
12 Judge Lenard I. Garth, a judicial giant on the Third Circuit, died September 22, 
2016, two months after Judge Shapiro. 
13 Harris v. Pernsley, 758 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1985). 
14 Pernsley v. Harris, 474 U.S. 965 (1985). 
15 Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952513 
MANUSCRIPT DRAFT  A Comment on the Courage of Norma L. Shapiro 
7 
 
twenty (20) out of forty (40) days, a bar on admission of 
prisoners to such facility or facilities will go into effect. The 
bar on additional inmates will continue until the number of 
inmates housed is within the maximum allowable population 
and new admissions will not cause the maximum allowable 
population to be exceeded, except that persons charged with, 
or convicted of, murder, forcible rape, or a crime involving 
the use of a knife or firearm during the commission of an 
aggravated assault or robbery, may always be admitted 
notwithstanding this bar.”16 
As a direct result of the consent decrees approved by Judge Shapiro, 
the City eventually closed the Holmesberg Prison and made good on its 
promise to build new detention facilities to relieve the problem of 
overcrowding.17 But those improvements were hard fought and took 
decades to achieve. In the meantime, the City’s delay in carrying out its 
obligations triggered the court’s requirement to release inmates who would 
otherwise have remained in detention. Judge Shapiro was subject to an 
unrelenting, decade-long campaign, to pressure her to change her mind and 
permit the City to back out of its settlement.  The Philadelphia Daily News 
famously ran daily stories (and a sidebar) about the “victims” of Judge 
Shapiro’s orders: 
                                                             
16 Id. 
17 Harris v. City of Phila., CIVIL ACTION NO. 82-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12579, at 
*8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2000).        
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Figure 1: Daily News Articles on the "Prison Cap" Litigation, Courtesy of the Archives of the 
Honorable Norma L. Shapiro, Biddle Library, University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
Imagine, if you will, the kind of pressure that such press exerted. And 
yet, from our perspective, permitting the City to escape the consequences of 
its own contractual commitments would have been worse.  It would have 
immunized the legislative and executive branches from the consequences of 
their own mismanagement.  Judge Shapiro believed in honoring 
commitments. So, rather than walk away, Judge Shapiro dug in.  She 
continued to exercise supervisory authority over the prison system until 
new facilities were in place, and the underlying constitutional infirmities, at 
least temporarily, cured. 
President Trump was but one of many harsh critics of Judge Shapiro 
for enforcing the inmate release provision. To be clear, judges are not—nor 
should they be—immune from criticism for their decisions and they remain 
bound by an ethical obligation to refrain from responding, even when 
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targeted unfairly.18  Judge Shapiro certainly did not agree with critics who 
used her as a scapegoat for the broader problems of crime and mass 
incarceration, but she understood that public rebuke was often an 
occupational hazard for judges compelled by their conscience and the 
Constitution to make deeply unpopular decisions. 
II. Chadwick v. Janecka: Fourteen Years of Civil Contempt 
Our second selection is the curious case of Chadwick v. Janecka.19   
Chadwick arose from a bitter state court divorce, commenced in 1992, 
between Beatty Chadwick and his estranged wife Barbara.20 Their marital 
estate included $2.5 million in assets under Beatty’s control and, after 
Barbara filed for divorce, Beatty offshored those assets to a Gibraltar 
account. Beatty claimed he transferred the funds to repay a foreign debt, but 
Barbara alleged that the transfers were a sham to defraud her of an 
equitable distribution.21  In 1995, Beatty fled the jurisdiction, but was 
apprehended shortly thereafter.  The state court ordered him detained for 
civil contempt until he complied with the court’s order to repatriate his 
assets.  Beatty argued that compliance was impossible because he no longer 
owned the assets, but the state court did not believe him.  Beatty therefore 
began serving what would become the longest term of incarceration for civil 
contempt in U.S. history. 
Claiming that his indefinite detention without a criminal charge 
violated constitutional due process, Beatty filed a flurry of serial habeas 
petitions: six in state and five in federal court.  His case arrived again before 
Judge Shapiro on the terminal (fifth) federal petition in 2000. There, Beatty 
argued that the purpose of civil contempt is to exact compliance with a court 
                                                             
18 Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Cannon 2A (“A judge must expect to be 
the subject of constant public scrutiny and accept freely and willingly restrictions 
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.”). 
19 Chadwick v. Janecka, No. CIV.A. 00-1130, 2002 WL 12292, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 
2002). 
20 Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002). 
21 Id. 
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order rather than to punish and, because the contempt order failed to 
compel compliance, his continued detention was unlawful.22  
Judge Shapiro found herself presiding over what appeared to be a 
convincing legal argument made by a highly unsympathetic inmate seeking 
release from prison.  How could a man be imprisoned indefinitely for years 
without an adjudication of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?  One the one 
hand, the state courts had repeatedly found that Beatty was hiding assets 
offshore and, if true, he was committing a fraud on his wife and the court to 
avoid dividing marital assets equitably in divorce.23  On the other hand, he 
had already served more time for civil contempt than he likely would have 
for theft of the same assets.  His obduracy suggested either that he didn’t 
have the money, or his will to keep it was as ironclad as the bars of his jail 
cell. 
Knowing full-well the high risk of reversal in granting habeas relief,24 
and disbelieving his impossibility defense, Judge Shapiro nonetheless ruled 
in Beatty’s favor.25  She concluded that continued detention was futile 
because he would not bend to the State Court’s power: 
“After what is now nearly seven years’ incarceration for failure to 
comply, there is a serious question whether confinement is still 
serving a coercive purpose. After this significant period of time, there 
                                                             
22 Id. at *4. 
23 Id. at *7 (“State courts have repeatedly found that Chadwick has the present 
ability to comply with the order to remit marital assets to a court escrow account for 
equitable distribution.”). 
24 The exceedingly high standard imposed upon petitioners seeking habeas relief in 
federal court makes it particularly easy for courts of appeal to overturn the grant of 
habeas relief by a district court and all district court judges know it. C.f., Chadwick v. 
Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if a state 
prisoner’s habeas claim ‘was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,’ 
[the appellate] standard of review is narrow: we may not reverse ‘unless the 
adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law . . . .’”). 
25 Id. (“The duration of Chadwick's incarceration has always been up to him; 
compliance with the state court order would guarantee his release. [. . . .] This court 
is convinced that Chadwick has the present ability to comply with the July 22, 1994 
order.”). 
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exists more than Chadwick’s mere assertion that further 
confinement will not coerce compliance.”26 
Consider for a moment how difficult this must have been for 
someone with Judge Shapiro’s convictions to write.  Here was an early, 
trailblazing feminist, and lifelong believer in the power of courts to coerce 
righteous conduct (as Harris shows!), letting a fraudster free, because she 
thought it was the right thing to do.27   
Barbara, alongside the state, appealed the grant of habeas relief and, 
although not unforeseen, the Court of Appeals reversed.  Writing for the 
appellate panel, then-Circuit Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Samuel 
Alito found that the exactingly high standard for habeas relief could not be 
satisfied by establishing that Beatty had “no substantial likelihood” of 
complying. 28  The Third Circuit noted that, in International Union v. 
Bagwell,29 the Supreme Court “seems to permit a contemnor who had the 
ability to comply with the underlying court order to be confined until he or 
she complies.”30  The panel therefore concluded that, “if this reading is 
correct, Bagwell directly contradicts the decision of the District Court in the 
present case.”31  Thus, after winning in the district court, Beatty had lost on 
appeal and went on to serve another seven years in state prison. Notably, 
                                                             
26 Id. 
27 We digress briefly here to note that Judge Shapiro’s outspoken passion for 
advancing the role of women in the law was always matched by her quiet, but 
equally meaningful and important, acts of professional courage. Novelist Magdalen 
Braden was at 38 the oldest student in her third year class at Penn Law in 1994. In 
part because of the age differential, Ms. Braden found herself having trouble finding 
legal employment for after graduation. Judge Shapiro, whom Braden had met at the 
Penn Inn of Court, recognized Braden’s sharp legal mind and untapped talent. Judge 
Shapiro not only hired Braden as a law clerk but also ensured that the Judge’s 
former law firm, then known as Dechert Price and Rhodes, gave Braden proper 
consideration in its hiring process. Braden credits Judge Shapiro’s role in landing a 
partner-track associate position at Dechert. There are, no doubt, countless other 
talented lawyers for whom Judge Shapiro played a similarly quiet role in promoting 
their careers and, in so doing, diversity of the legal profession.      
28 Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 613 (3d Cir. 2002). 
29 International Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994). 
30 Id. at 608 (citing  International Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994)). 
31 Id. 
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although the Third Circuit reversed, it did so with great apparent 
appreciation for Judge Shapiro’s meticulous work on the case below.   
For any self-respecting trial judge, reversal on appeal is typically a 
poignant moment of professional disappointment.  This was especially true 
of Judge Shapiro, who took great pride in the painstaking quality of her 
opinions, which remain widely admired for their logical coherence and 
exceptional clarity.  We select this case from the thousands of Shapiro’s 
opinions, not to highlight a moment of defeat (and consequent discussions 
with a former clerk at a judicial reunion) but because it illustrates her 
elegant view of the Constitution as supremely above the fray of rough 
justice.  Beatty’s defense was repeatedly discredited by the state court and 
surely he did not deserve to be rewarded with habeas relief for performing a 
legal stunt to defraud his wife of martial assets.  Had Beatty been charged 
with a criminal offense and sentenced to imprisonment following a lawful 
conviction, we have no doubt that Judge Shapiro would have decided the 
case differently.  But Beatty was not charged with any crime.  Thus, lurking 
in the ether of Judge Shapiro’s opinion is a profound but simple notion of 
constitutional due process: the state’s power to detain a person indefinitely 
in the absence of a criminal charge cannot be justified by the detainee’s 
conduct, no matter how unsavory or distasteful, without first obtaining a 
lawful conviction.   
Chadwick also exemplifies the enduring wisdom of Judge Shapiro’s 
legal instincts, even though her uncanny judicial foresight did not become 
evident until long after her ruling was reversed on appeal.  As it turns out, 
Judge Shapiro was right all along: the state’s indefinite detention of Beatty 
Chadwick was not an effective sanction to coerce him into compliance.  In 
2009, another seven years after the Third Circuit ruled that Beatty could be 
detained indefinitely, and after he had achieved the distinction of setting a 
record for civil contempt detention in the United States, the Pennsylvania 
state court finally released Beatty for precisely the same reasons that Judge 
Shapiro articulated in 2002.32  It held that Beatty had the ability to comply 
                                                             
32 Indeed, the Third Circuit, too, set the stage for the state court’s reconsideration.  
Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 614 (3d Cir. 2002) (“needless to say, our decision 
imposes no restrictions on the state courts' ability to grant relief”). 
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with the order to repatriate his assets, but the sanction had lost its coercive 
effect and, consequently, his continued detention had become punitive.33  It 
also seems that Judge Shapiro’s skepticism of Beatty’s story about the 
missing offshore assets was well-founded.  In 2010, a reporter for the 
Philadelphia Inquirer found that Beatty had created an online dating profile 
describing himself as a bachelor with  expensive taste (subscriptions to the 
orchestra, ballet, opera, and theater; a passion for European travel and wine 
tasting).34  Beatty might have added: here’s a man who can hold grudge! 
III. Evans v. Beard: A State Court Sentencing Error Corrected 
11 Years Later 
Our third and final case is Evans v. Beard, a habeas petition brought 
by William Evans, a state prisoner convicted on multiple counts of incest and 
the rape of young children.35  At the outset, we acknowledge that the crimes 
committed by Mr. Evans distinguish him as, by far, the least sympathetic 
petitioner featured in this memoriam. Recognizing the severity of his crimes, 
one of the state courts sentenced Mr. Evans to more than 700 years’ 
imprisonment. However, that sentence was later vacated on appeal in an 
exceptionally complex multi-jurisdictional state court procedural history 
that we need not recount here. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that 
the Mr. Evans began his incarceration in 1986 and, in 1994, his 700-year 
sentenced was reduced to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment.   
Throughout his sentence, Mr. Evans received annual correspondence 
from the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole stating that he would 
                                                             
33 See Mari A. Schaefer, Chadwick freed after 14-year contempt sentence, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer at A1 (July 11, 2009). 
34 Monica Yant Kinney, Beatty Chadwick, trolling Match.com, still defying truth, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer at A1 (Nov. 10, 2010). Although Judge Shapiro probably never 
actually saw Beatty’s online profile, she was keenly aware of what was happening 
on the Internet. Former clerk Michelle Ryan Scharfenberg describes Judge Shapiro’s 
admonition on the use of courthouse computers: “I joined Chambers in fall 1998, a 
time when the internet was just starting to become something.  On one of my first 
days there, my co-clerk and I were sitting at our desks and the judge walked in and 
faced us and said ‘Don’t use the computer to look up porn.’  And that was the extent 
of my ‘computer training’ for the job. I was both a little shocked and amused by her 
‘training.’” 
35 Evans v. Beard, 639 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
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be released on November 13, 2006.  But in April 2005, shortly before his 
anticipated release, Mr. Evans received a different notice.  This time, the 
Board informed him that it had added four and a half years to his sentence 
because, in the 1994 re-sentencing hearing, the state court judge improperly 
computed credit for time served.36 
As it turns out, the 2005 notice was correct about the sentencing 
judge’s erroneous computation.  Mr. Evans had been convicted in separate 
proceedings in two Pennsylvania counties.  This fact was significant because 
state law precluded the grant of credit for time served on a prior unrelated 
sentence before the effective date of a subsequently imposed concurrent 
sentence.37  The problem in Mr. Evans’ view, however, was that the state 
waited almost 11 years to correct the error and, when it finally issued a 
correction, the judge signed a new sentence without notice to Mr. Evans or 
an opportunity to be heard.  Mr. Evans filed a federal habeas petition 
randomly assigned to Judge Shapiro. 
We surmise that, had Judge Shapiro presided over the original 
resentencing of Mr. Evans, she would have imposed a harsher punishment 
than 10 to 20 years because of the extraordinary severity of his crimes.  But 
the wisdom of the state court’s resentencing decision of 10 to 20 years was 
not the subject of her review.  Rather, the question presented was whether 
the state could correct an erroneously lenient sentence nearly 11 years after 
its imposition.   
Judge Shapiro concluded (courageously, in our view) that, 
notwithstanding the horribleness of what brought Mr. Evans into the 
criminal justice system, the state’s mishandling of the sentence shocked the 
conscience and therefore violated his right to substantive due process.  The 
District Court opinion explained: 
“The Department of Corrections' gross delay in seeking the 
state court’s correction of Evans' Form DC–300B was 
fundamentally unfair, as was the court’s decision to grant the 
amendment. As early as 1994, the Department of Corrections 
                                                             
36 Id. at 501. 
37 Id. at 499-500. 
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had actual knowledge that Form DC–300B granted Evans 
more credit than it believed was allowed under state law. 
After the Clerk of Court certified Form DC–300B granting the 
contested credit over the Department’s objection in February 
1995, the Department abandoned the issue for more than a 
decade. In 2005, eleven years after the sentence was 
imposed and Evans had exhausted his appeal (and just one 
year before his scheduled release), the Department renewed 
its effort to remove the time credit. The Department's 
prolonged delay in seeking correction of Form DC–300B is 
shocking to the conscience; so was the court's decision to 
grant the amendment. If the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause imposes a temporal limit on the power of a 
sentencing court to correct an illegal sentence, an eleven year 
delay by the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas certainly 
exceeded that limit.”38 
Fully aware of the strong likelihood of reversal in cases like this, Judge 
Shapiro nevertheless granted Mr. Evans’ habeas petition because she 
believed the Constitution required it.  Anticipating the district attorney’s 
response, however, Judge Shapiro ordered that Mr. Evans’ release be 
postponed for 30 days to give the state an opportunity to file an appeal.39  
The state filed a timely appeal and, as a further precaution, Judge Shapiro 
yielded the decision of whether to stay Mr. Evans’ release pending appeal to 
the Third Circuit. On the state’s emergency motion, a two-judge motions 
panel of the Third Circuit denied the stay.40  Mr. Evans was now a free man. 
 Mr. Evans’ release from prison quickly attracted media attention.  A 
Philadelphia television station, 6ABC Action News, covered the story on the 
local evening news with the headline, “CONVICTED CHILD RAPIST 
                                                             
38 Id. at 508-09. 
39 By that point, Mr. Evans had served more than two and a half years beyond his 
original 2006 release date.   
40 Order at 1, Evans v. Beard, No. 09-2657 (3d Cir. June 26, 2009) (“The forgoing 
motion for a stay is denied.”). 
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RELEASED EARLY.”41  The reporter interviewed the local District Attorney, 
who characterized the problem in Mr. Evans’ resentencing as a “clerical 
error.”  This, of course, was true, but incomplete.  The sentencing judge’s 
clerical error was not the aspect of Mr. Evans’ proceeding found by Judge 
Shapiro to violate substantive due process; it was the state’s gross delay in 
correcting it.  The reporter also interviewed a children’s rights advocate who 
worried that Mr. Evans’ release would discourage young victims of rape and 
sexual abuse from seeking help.42  We share the advocate’s concern about 
the problem of underreported child abuse, but it is difficult to identify a 
direct link between that problem and Mr. Evans’ case.  By the time of his 
release, Mr. Evans had already served more than half of the additional four 
years added by the belated correction of his sentence.   
 Nearly two years following Mr. Evans’ release, the Third Circuit 
reversed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief.43  Writing for the Third 
Circuit, however, Judge Kent Jordan was deliberately measured in 
expressing disagreement. Indeed, the carefully worded opinion appears as if 
it were drafted to emote the panel’s great respect for Judge Shapiro and her 
legal analysis.  Judge Jordan repeatedly emphasized the “amorphous 
character of the shock-the-conscience test,”44 and offered the uncommonly 
disarming concession that “[w]hat is shocking to the conscience inevitably 
depends to a degree on whose conscience is being tested; so, to put it mildly, 
the standard has some give in it.”45 Judge Jordan’s words are a rare public 
acknowledgement that, although reversed, Judge Shapiro was not mistaken 
in her analysis, but that reasonable minds simply differ in applying a weakly 
defined constitutional due process standard.   
We select this case to remember Judge Shapiro, again, not to revisit 
the disappointment felt by all trial judges when an opinion is reversed on 
appeal.  Rather, this case presents a compelling illustration of Judge 
                                                             
41 Walter Perez, CONVICTED CHILD RAPIST RELEASED EARLY, 6abc Action News 
(June 30, 2009) available at http://6abc.com/archive/6892312/. 
42 Id.  
43 Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 652 (3d Cir. 2011). 
44 Id. at 661. 
45 Id. at 660.  For an alternative theory of habeas relief on Double Jeopardy grounds, 
see Reid K. Weisbord & George C. Thomas, III, Judicial Sentencing Error and the 
Constitution, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1617, 1652 (2016). 
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Shapiro’s steadfast unwillingness to follow the path of least resistance when 
confronted by a challenging or controversial matter.  In Evans, Judge Shapiro 
could have easily disposed of the case by curtly adopting the magistrate’s 
Report and Recommendation against granting relief.  Such a ruling would all 
but guarantee affirmance on appeal.  But Judge Shapiro assumed the risk of 
reversal in making the harder decision to grant habeas relief because, to her, 
the state’s mishandling of Evans’ sentence was not a harmless clerical error, 
as argued by the District Attorney. To the contrary, the state’s gross delay in 
correcting an erroneously lenient sentence inflicted a significant, though 
intangible, harm that implicated the venerable constitutional protection of 
substantive due process.   
* * * 
 These three cases can be variously described. For some, they might 
suggest a district judge unwilling to bend to hierarchical authority, and 
consequently a rogue agent within the federal judiciary.  That’s not what we 
see.  We see a woman with rare courage to do what was right, who tried to 
push all those she came in contact with—the lawyers and citizens who 
appeared before her, the appellate judges who sat above her, her colleagues 
on the bench, and her clerks—to a path of righteous justice. It takes guts to 
be accused of being an accomplice to murder by your City’s paper, and it 
takes just as much to order the release of guilty men. That’s true even when 
you are convinced it's the right thing to do.  Donald Trump, for whatever his 
other virtues and political instincts, got the gist of our former boss all wrong. 
There are not “plenty of Shapiros out there,” and there never were. 
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